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COMMENT
DIGITAL SAMPLING: OLD-FASHIONED PIRACY
DRESSED UP IN SLEEK NEW TECHNOLOGY
In a dream, a young record producer envisions a ballad crooned by
the King, Elvis Presley, and accompanied by the brilliant solos of the
legendary trumpeter, Miles Davis. Mesmerized by the vision, the pro-
ducer's mind grew obsessed with the idea of the song. Although it was
impossible to record with Elvis, he decided to produce the song by audi-
tioning Elvis sound-a-likes and negotiating with Miles Davis. Upon in-
quiry the producer discovered the revered trumpeter's fees were far
above his recording budget. Similarly, none of the Elvis sound-a-likes
really sounded like Elvis. Dejected, he resigned himself to the futility of
the project. Later, during a phone call with a fellow record producer, he
recounted his dilemma concerning the song. The other producer laughed
and said, "I have the power to make Elvis sing and Miles Davis play in
any way you may command. Come over to my studio." Within two
weeks, the song had been recorded using the voice of Elvis and the trum-
pet playing of Miles Davis.
An amusing fantasy? Hardly. The record producer was not lying,
for this is a tale of scientific fact. Although the notion of a musical artist,
living or dead, singing or playing a musical instrument without his con-
sent or input seems absurd, it is an amazing innovation originating from
the breakthrough technology of digital audio recording. At issue is the
use of digital samplers, devices capable of identifying, analyzing, captur-
ing and duplicating any sound even if surrounded by other sounds.' The
controversy concerns whether the practice of digitally sampling a copy-
1. Thus, it seems Elvis is alive, well and living in a digital sampler. See, Seligman, Saved!
Classic Rock Tracts Kept Forever Young on C.D., 482 ROLLING STONE 81, 82-83 (1986) [here-
inafter Seligman]:
At the rate of 44,100 times per second, a digital recorder samples a musical signal
and analyzes each harmonic and dynamic characteristic within it and instantly ren-
ders the data in a binary code that can be understood by computer. A musical
phrase as short as "She loves you yeah, yeah, yeah" would be sampled 11,250 times.
The entire two-minute nineteen-second song would require roughly 6,129,900 sepa-
rate samples. The resulting code for each sample is recorded on a digital master tape
and any subsequent copies reproduce those numbers exactly. This largely explains
why digital compact discs reveal the extremes of the sonic spectrum with such clarity
and presence.
Id.
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righted record violates the Sound Recording Act of 1971 ("the Act"),
which protects "the actual sounds fixed in the recording" from
duplication.2
Returning to the above example, it would be possible for a sampling
device to analyze the complete recorded works of Miles Davis, identify,
separate and store the various individual sounds and create a library of
note executions.3 A record manufacturer could then draw sounds from
2. The Sound Recording Act of 1971, 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1976), provides:
Scope of Exclusive Rights in Sound Recordings
(a) The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording are
limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106, and do not
include any right of performance under section 106(4).
(b) The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the
form of phonorecords, or of copies of motion picture and other audiovisual works,
that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. The
exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (i) of
section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual
sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in
sequence or quality. The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound re-
cording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or
duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixa-
tion of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copy-
righted sound recording. The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound
recording under clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106 do not apply to sound record-
ings included in educational television and radio programs (as defined in section 397
of title 47) distributed or transmitted by or through public broadcasting entities (as
defined by section 118(g): Provided, that copies or phonorecords of said programs are
not commercially distributed by or through public broadcasting entities to the gen-
eral public.
(c) This section does not limit or impair the exclusive right to perform pub-
licly, by means of a phonorecord, any of the works specified by section 106(4).
(d) On January 3, 1978, the Register of Copyrights, after consulting with rep-
resentatives of owners of copyrighted materials, representatives of broadcasting, re-
cording, motion picture, entertainment industries, and arts organizations,
representatives of organized labor and performers of copyrighted materials, shall
submit to the Congress a report setting forth recommendations as to whether this
section should be amended to provide for performers and copyright owners of copy-
righted material any performance rights in such material. The report should describe
the status of such rights in foreign countries, the views of major interested parties,
and specific legislative or other recommendations, if any.
Id.
3. The Sound Recording Act of 1971, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) provides:
Exclusive Rights in Copyrighted Works
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphics, or sculptural works, including the individual
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this library and create a new sound recording performance from a previ-
ous recording. By this process, Elvis will sing again in full album re-
leases.4 Uses of actual sounds fixed in a copyright, without copyright
permission, seemingly are clear violations of the Sound Recording Act.
Unfortunately, there is rampant confusion in both the recording in-
dustry and the courts concerning digital sampling and the scope of pro-
tection provided by the Sound Recording Act. Specifically, current
record manufacturers and artists suffer from the misconception that if
they only take some or part of the sounds from a copyrighted work they
are not taking at all.5 In United States v. Taxe,6 which concerned the
duplication of an entire song, the court held that "trivial re-recordings of
one or two notes might very well be held to be such an insubstantial
taking as not to infringe."7 Taxe, however, was decided a full decade
before the arrival of digital audio technology.
This comment journeys through the confusion to determine if vari-
ous forms of digital sampling' are violations of the Sound Recording Act.
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
Id.
"Note execution" refers to the sounds created when a musical note is sung or performed
by an instrument in a sound recording. A distinction should be made between the sound
recording and the material medium in which it is found. In the Sound Recording Act, Con-
gress defines sound recordings as: "[w]orks that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as discs, tapes, or
phonorecords, in which they are embodied .... 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
Phonorecords are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later devel-
oped, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term "phonorecords" includes the
material object in which the sounds are first fixed. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
These definitions illustrate a purposeful recognition of the sounds, standing alone, as a
recognized copyrightable intellectual creation, while the actual phonorecord or disc is viewed
as a constantly changing technological pack mule, which, regardless of its sophistication,
merely serves as a carrier for the sound recording trace.
4. The value of a single word sung by Elvis is evidenced in the ability to sample pho-
nemes, the individual sounds that form a word. RCA's upcoming release, "The Return of the
Rocker," is an album composed of sampled portions from rotting zinc oxide tapes manufac-
tured in the 1960's. Digital editors and equalizers can clean up and modernize the sound of an
old master tape and even change it. Digital delay adds spatial ambiance, dynamic expanders
bring back the full sonic spectrum of the original recording session and noise filters alleviate
mechanical tape hiss. See Seligman, supra note 1, at 83-89.
5. Dupler, Digital Sampling: Is It Theft?, 98 BILLBOARD MAG. 11, 74 (1986).
6. 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 540 F.2d 961
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
7. Id. at 1014.
8. One use of digital sampling is the straightforward reproduction of the original works,
which illustrates the technique's ability to analyze and separate the sounds of a piano from
19881
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To determine the scope of protection of the Act, the journey must travel
three separate paths. First, it is necessary to map out and explain the
intent of the provisions of the Sound Recording Act of 1971, as well as
address the relatively late enactment of copyright protections to sound
recording. 9 Second, it is necessary to discover that Congress' delayed
recognition of sound recordings as copyrightable works resulted in a va-
riety of state piracy laws. The states enacted their piracy laws on a myr-
iad of legal theories now implicit in the Act."0 However, they legislated
with great caution, fearing their laws may be found unconstitutional due
to federal preemption in the realm of copyright."' Therefore, it is neces-
sary not only to traverse the area of piracy law to determine differences
between the state laws and the Act, but also to determine how the laws
continue to influence judicial interpretation of the Act.
Third, it is necessary to walk even further into the past, beyond
piracy laws, to the actual right that states were protecting-composition
copyright. The composer was the first musical author granted copyright
protection. Thus, decisions in this area have influenced the extension of
musical copyright to sound recordings. Many judicial assumptions
those of a guitar, even if both were recorded on the same track. Another use is to produce
distortions of the sounds to the extent that they become unrecognizable as to the original. This
ability suggests the question of whether copyright infringement exists when a sound is repro-
duced without permission, yet it is so altered that it is unrecognizable to the original perform-
ance. Even if the result is unrecognizable, the fact remains that the sounds reproduced were
chosen for their exploitable characteristics which were the origin or base of the distortion.
9. The Sound Recording Act of 1971 was seen as the solution to the rampant record
piracy created by the development of the cassette tape recorder. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, COPYRIGHT-SOUND RECORDINGS, HOUSE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 646, H.R.
REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1566, 1576 [hereinafter 1971 HOUSE REPORT].
10. Unfair competition and misappropriation are the dominant theories. See Fame Pub-
lishing Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, 507 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841
(1975); United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
11. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964), are sister cases concerning actions to enjoin imitations of
unpatentable designs. In both cases the Court held that state unfair competition remedies were
limited to labelling requirements to prevent palming off. The Supreme Court stated:
When an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid
others to copy that article. To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy,
found in Article I, § 8 clause 8 of the Constitution and in the implementing federal
statutes to allow free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain.
Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237.
The reluctance of the Court, bordering on weariness, to tread in an area specifically in the
jurisdiction of Congress is evidenced in many cases. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390
(1968); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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formed in composition decisions do not apply to sound recordings, yet
they continue to influence sound recording decisions.
By travelling these three paths, we inevitably end up on the road to
defining the extent of copyright power bestowed on the sound recording
author: the artist. The progress of technology forces us to uncover the
implicit rights possessed by an artist/author. The court has never before
encountered the new forms of piracy now possible due to audio digital
technology barely a decade old. However, the abuses of technology lead
to the recognition and rediscovery of the sound recording author's im-
plicit right-the right to control recorded performance. Without such a
reanalysis, an incongruous result of a copyrighted work which is both
protected by copyright but also part of the public domain will occur.
THE SOUND RECORDING ACT: FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The Effects of Delay
It is impossible to understand Congressional intent without probing
the historical incentives which propelled the Act's legislation and enact-
ment. The most important inquiry is to determine why Congress delayed
recognition of sound recordings as copyrightable works. It is necessary to
further measure the effects of that delay. The unfortunate delay was a
product of political self-interest rather than a lack of merit or originality.
At the turn of the century, powerful broadcasting and juke box in-
terests successfully lobbied Congress to exclude sound recordings from
the protections of the Copyright Act of 1909.12 The special interest
groups wished to avoid paying new licensing and royalty fees, while vo-
calists, musicians and producers sought protection and compensation.13
The various legal theories denying extension of copyright protection to
sound recordings have consisted of basically four arguments:
1. Records are not "writings" since (a) they are not legible
[(they cannot be read or seen)], (b) the Supreme Court has held
that they are not "copies," and (c) they are "material objects"
12. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF
SOUND RECORDINGS 37 (Comm. Print 1961) (Study No. 26 by Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights) [hereinafter RINGER].
13. Id. Many early cases held that sound recordings did not meet the definition of a copy-
rightable writing. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d
Cir. 1955); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940); Jerome v. Twentieth Century Fox-Film Corp., 67 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd,
165 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1948); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194
A. 631 (1937); Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
1988]
LOYOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
or "mechanical devices" and thus belong under patent rather
than copyright protection.
2. Protection for a recording would violate the [composer's]
"exclusive right" in the work that had been recorded.
3. Performers [(musicians, vocalists)] cannot be regarded as
''authors" since their contributions do not amount to original
intellectual creations.
4. Record manufacturers cannot be regarded as "authors"
since their contributions do not amount to original intellectual
creations. "
These theories not only confuse sound recordings with the material
objects in which they are fixed, but also judge musical and vocal perform-
ances as inferior, nonintellectual creations. It was precisely this type of
value judgment that the federal judiciary wished to avoid. 5 Although
these arguments served as a good shield for the royalty dodging motives
of interest groups, they were inconsistent with the judicial trend to ex-
pand federal copyright protection.
Originally, the federal judiciary interpreted the Constitution's copy-
right clause as protecting only creations which shared similar character-
istics with books. 16  The two prominent characteristics were the
communication of ideas by the tangible fixation of images on a sheet of
14. RINGER, supra note 12, at 47.
15. In a case concerning an artist's circus illustrations, Justice Holmes warns of the many
dangers that would occur if judges were to determine whether an object was "art," and there-
fore worthy of copyright protection:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would
be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the
public had learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more
than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet
would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end,
copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than
the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial
value-it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational
value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
16. The federal judiciary, for the first hundred years of the Constitution, followed the list
recognized by Congress when extending copyright protection. The list included books, maps,
charts, dramatic musical compositions, engravings, cuts, prints, paintings, drawings, statutes,
statutory models and designs. This is illustrated in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
Il l U.S. 53 (1884), where the judiciary interpreted the copyright clause of the Constitution to
include photographs. "Unless, therefore, photographs can be distinguished in the classification
on this point from the maps, charts, designs, engravings, etchings, cuts, and other prints, it is




paper and the ability to be perceived by the human eye.' 7 As a result, a
musical composer's creation could be copyrighted because his ideas
could be perceived by printing the musical score or notation on a sheet of
paper. Conversely, a musical sound recording author could not receive
protection, because musical sounds recorded on record discs were invisi-
ble and were not considered "writings."
However, the federal courts soon adopted the policy that judges
would not arbitrate artistic merit and began to interpret the terms "writ-
ings" and "authors" broadly.'" The broad interpretation is consistent
with the three separate theories motivating copyright protection. The
first of these theories is the public policy provision that society benefits
when inventors are guaranteed protection over their creations. This pol-
icy implies that society rewards an author's creations with the grant of a
monopoly over his work so that society may benefit from his originality
and genius, while concurrently giving the author economic incentive to
share his genius.19
Second, Professor Nimmer argues for the "natural rights" theory of
private property. 2° For example, a monopoly of control is given to the
owner of a possession upon purchase. Therefore, when a consumer
purchases a car, it becomes his private property. In the case of a copy-
right author, it is by creation that an "author" owns a "writing." If gov-
17. When extending protection to photographs in Burrow, the Court put great emphasis
on the necessity for an author's writing or other creation to be perceived by the human eye:
[N]o one would now claim that the word writing in this clause of the Constitution,
though the only word used as to subjects in regard to which authors are to be se-
cured, is limited to the actual script of the author, and excludes books and all other
printed matter. By writings in that clause is meant the literary productions of those
authors, and Congress very properly has declared these to include all forms of writ-
ing, printing, engraving, etching, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author
are given visible expression.
Burrow, Ill U.S. at 58.
The Court then explained that the only reason photographs were not on the list is because
the photographic process was not yet in existence. Id.
18. An example of the Court's refusal to arbitrate the artistic merit and interpret the copy-
right laws broadly is evidenced by the grant of copyright protection to a mass produced balle-
rina shaped lamp base in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). See also supra note 15.
The present list of copyrightable objects is divided into categories: "Works of authorship
include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works; including any accom-
panying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
19. "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
the useful Arts.' " Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
20. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03.A at 1-32 [hereinafter NIMMER].
1988]
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ernment bestows a monopoly to a property owner, certainly a genius who
creates his own property deserves a monopoly over it.2
Third, the marketability or commercial value of a creation is a rea-
son for granting copyright.2 2 The courts acknowledged the obvious-the
only reason an object is counterfeited or a record is pirated is to capture
the unique appeal it inspires in the consumer. Certainly, record sales in
the billions indicate the economic value of sound recordings. Despite the
broad interpretation of the copyright clause, sound recordings remained
unprotected until the early 1970's.
Congressional delay produced two separate problems. First, be-
cause composers were recognized and given protection at an early date,
composition law became dominant in the musical field. These cases de-
veloped important elements of law that are implicit in the Sound Record-
ing Act. However, perceptions developed in the separate area of musical
composition copyright, influencing the protection given to sound records,
without consideration of differences between the mediums.2"
Moreover, the delay in recognition also facilitated piracy for crimi-
nal duplication. By the 1960's and early 1970's virtually one-fourth of all
records and tapes sold in the United States were illegal duplicates.2 4 The
debilitating economic effect of piracy helped to unite the various en-
tertainment interest groups. The enactment of the Sound Recording Act
of 1971 finally granted sound recordings the copyright protection ex-
tended to other intellectual creations.
The Sound Recording Act Of 1971
The Sound Recording Act of 1971 provided long overdue federal
copyright protection to vocalists, musicians, engineers and record manu-
facturers.2 5 The long delay had fostered rampant piracy and confusion
21. As stated in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975):
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ulti-
mately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
Id. (footnote omitted).
22. See Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 440-42, 194 A. 631, 635
(1937).
23. For discussion of the differences, see infra note 30 and accompanying text.
24. Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and H.R. 6927 Before Sub-
comm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1971) [hereinafter
PIRACY HEARINGS].
25. "The pirating of records and tapes is not only depriving legitimate manufacturers of
substantial income, but of equal importance is denying performing artists and musicians of
[Vol. 8
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in the state courts.2 6 The Congressional scheme was to grant copyright
protection to sound recording artists while preserving freedom of musical
exchange. As a result, the Act prescribes a "special and limited" status to
musical authors when compared to other copyright authors.27 This spe-
cial and limited protection in no way implies a badge of inferiority on
sound recording works.
This policy is illustrated in subsection l(f) of the Act which specifi-
cally refers to the limitations of the reproductive, adaptive and distribu-
tive rights granted to the copyright author. The reproductive right
grants copyright authors the exclusive right to make copies of their
work. 28 But the sound recording author's reproductive right is "limited
to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form ... that directly
or indirectly recapture[s] the actual sounds fixed in the recording."29
The Act clarifies this limitation by stating that the right of reproduction
does "not extend to the making or duplication of another sound record-
ing that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even
though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound
recording."30
Thus, the sound recording author's copyright is diminished since he
royalties and contributions to pension and welfare funds and Federal and State governments
are losing tax revenues." 1971 HOUSE REPORT supra note 9, at 1567.
26. The Copyright Act of 1909 protected the musical composer and composition. How-
ever, the Act contained a compulsory licensing fee allowing any artist to record a song by
compensating the composer according to a statutorily prescribed fee. Since the Act did not
protect the recording's sound on records, pirates believed they could legitimize their unauthor-
ized duplication by paying the compulsory license fee for the composition. "This follows from
the provision in section 1 (e) that, when the owner of a musical copyright has permitted anyone
to record his music, any other person may make similar use of the musical work upon payment
of a royalty of two cents per recording." 1971 HOUSE REPORT supra note 9, at 1579.
The situation fostered a back door to legitimacy which encouraged piracy. The Sound
Recording Act of 1971 was enacted to slam this door shut. "If the unauthorized producers
pay the statutory mechanical royalty required by the Copyright Act for the use of copyrighted
music there is no Federal remedy currently available to combat the unauthorized reproduction
of the recording." Id. at 1567. "The Committee regrets that action on the bill for general
revision of the copyright law has been delayed, and that the problem of record piracy has not
been dealt with as part of a broad reform of the Federal copyright statute." Id. at 1569.
27. "It is also true under existing law that the protection given to owners of copyright in
musical works with respect to recordings of their works is special and limited." Id. at 1567.
28. NIMMER, supra note 20. See also infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1976).
30. Id. "Under the bill, sound recordings are defined as 'works that result from the fixa-
tion of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including sounds accompanying a
motion picture.' " 1971 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 1578. "The exclusive right created
thereby is limited to the duplication in tangible form of the specific recorded performance
copyrighted: it does not include imitation or simulation of that performance." Id. (emphasis
added).
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only has protection over the exact sounds he creates. He cannot prohibit
another from recording and imitating his (the copyright author's) unique
sounds as long as the imitator creates his own set of sounds utilizing his
own musicians and recording processes.3" Congress intentionally al-
lowed the simulation or imitation of copyrighted musical sounds because
the policy behind the free exchange of musical information requires that
no one may obtain a monopoly over a musical sound and prohibit others
from recording. 2 Conversely, an artist does obtain a monopoly over the
individual sounds or musical voicings he creates. The author is given
reproductive, adaptive and distributive control of his sounds and thereby
can reproduce and distribute copies of the music to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership.33 For example, Miles Davis controls the
actual sounds he creates, yet another trumpeter is free to attempt to
reproduce the exact sounds on another album if he wishes.
The full recognition of sound recordings as "works" in the constitu-
tional sense is evidenced by Congressional response to the petitioning of
pirates lobbying for a compulsory licensing provision concerning sound
recordings." The Senate Committee rejected the proposal highlighting
the core distinction between musical composition and sound recording:
[T]he existing compulsory license merely provides access to the
copyrighted musical composition, which is the "raw material"
,of a recording [as opposed to] . . . the performers, arrangers,
and recording experts [who] are needed to produce the finished
creative work in the form of a distinctive sound recording....
[T]here is "no justification for the granting of a compulsory li-
cense to copy the finished product, which has been developed
and promoted through the efforts of the recording company
31. See Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, 506 F.2d 393, 397 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975); United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267
(W.D. Okla. 1974).
32. As stated in Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d
285, 287 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975):
Congress in 1909 considerably extended the copyright interest of the composer to the
end that thereafter the copyright owner of a musical composition could himself con-
trol the mechanical reproduction of his composition. At the same time, fearful that
by permitting a musical composition to be thus copyrighted it was permitting an
absolute monopoly, Congress tacked on a proviso or exception to the statute author-
izing the copyright of musical compositions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
34. "[C]ertain of the manufacturers engaged in the unauthorized reproduction of records
and tapes have proposed the inclusion in the legislation of provisions granting a compulsory
license to reproduce records and tapes upon payment of a statutory royalty." 1971 HOUSE




In other words, the composition of a song was only the raw material
of a song. Performers, arrangers and engineers were needed to transform
the notes on paper, or the raw material into the unique and distinctive
sounds or note voicings that compose a record. Importantly, each indi-
vidual performer has a copyright in his sounds. Since the Act recognizes
each performer and each engineer as an author, the industry custom re-
sults in the record company buying the copyrights of each author, thus
making the record company the exclusive copyright proprietor.36 There-
fore, the digital sampling of a single instrument from a copyrighted re-
cording is a violation of that author's reproductive copyright which may
be owned by the record company.
Although the provisions of the Act do not specifically list copyright
owners of a sound recording, the Senate Committee drafting the Act
names performers, engineers and manufacturers as co-authors and thus,
co-owners. As stated by Congress:
The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually,
though not always, involve "authorship" both on the part of
performers whose performance is captured and on the part of
the record producer responsible for setting up the recording
session, capturing and electronically processing the sounds, and
compiling and editing them to make the final sound recording.
There may be cases where the record producer's contribution is
so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable ele-
ment in the work .... [T]he bill does not fix the authorship, or
the resulting ownership, of sound recordings, but leaves these
matters to the employment relationship and bargaining among
the interests involved.37
It is important to emphasize that the Act recognizes that "there may
be cases (for example, recordings of birdcalls, [or the] sounds of racing
cars, et cetera) where only the record producer's contribution is copy-
rightable."3 This illustrates that the unauthorized reproduction of even
a bird call found on a copyrighted recording is prohibited. One must find
the nest, climb the tree, bring the equipment and record the chirping,
35. Id. Congress additionally acknowledged an unfair advantage that pirates exploited. A
compulsory license on sound recordings "would enable the 'pirates' to select those recordings
that become hits, and thus to invade the producer's market for his profitable recordings, while
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using one's own labor. "Aside from cases in which sounds are fixed by
some purely mechanical means without originality of any kind, the com-
mittee favors copyright protection that would prevent the reproduction
and distribution of unauthorized reproductions of sound recordings." 39
The Act's small scope of protection must be closely guarded. Only
exact sounds produced by the author are given protection. The policy of
allowing imitation or simulation of a sound recording work results in
limiting sound recording authors from applying their right of reproduc-
tion to control infringements occurring in other media. Copyright au-
thors in all other media can prevent the imitation or simulation of their
works.4" Drawing a sketch from a copyrighted photo,4' manufacturing a
doll similar to a cartoon character 42 and making a movie similar to a
book4 3 have been held as copyright infringements. These uses are consid-
ered so similar to the original work that they constitute misappropria-
tions of another's labor. Nevertheless, anyone who wishes to identically
reproduce a copyrighted sound recording may do so by paying the com-
pulsory license to the composer and by hiring and recording musicians.
Additionally, the Act does not contain a performance right provi-
sion for sound recording artists.' It should be noted that due to bureau-
cratic error, the Act applies only to recordings made after 1972. Works
recorded prior to 1972 are still protected by state law. 45 The granting of
39. Id.
40. Simply because a work in one medium has been copied from a work in another me-
dium does not render it any less than a "copy." Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Con-
sumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982). In a case involving a two-dimensional
reproduction of a three-dimensional work, the Fifth Circuit found infringement of copyright.
Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg., 421 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970). Similarly, a three-
dimensional reproduction of a two-dimensional illustration was found to be an infringement.
Walco Prods. v. Kittay & Blitz, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
41. See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The draw-
ing of a sketch from a frame of the Kennedy assassination file known as the "Zapruder film,"
was held to be an infringement of the copyright that Time, Inc. owned in the photograph.
42. Fleischer Studios v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied
294 U.S. 717 (1935); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924); Ideal
Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
43. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 668 F.2d 91
(2d Cir. 1981); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 426 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1976) supra note 2. Opposition to a performance right in
sound recordings has come from broadcasting and music publishing interests. Broadcasters
fear additional royalties, while publishing interests are reluctant to share the fees they already
garner for the performance of musical works. Hearings on S. 597 Before Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 502,
536 (1967).
45. "The bill does not apply retroactively and Section 3 expressly states that it should not
be construed as affecting in any way any rights with respect to sound recordings fixed before
the date of enactment. It thus does not deal with recorded performances already in existence.
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copyright protection is not an idle gesture. The limitations do reduce the
scope of the sound recording author's rights, yet they also focus the pro-
tection of the Act in one specific area, the exclusive control of actual
sounds fixed in their recorded performance. Unauthorized reproduction
of a copyright author's sound violates the Act's intent.
PIRACY AND THE STATES: SCOPE, LEGAL
THEORIES, JUDICIAL TRENDS
The second leg of this journey travels three paths which all lead to
the conclusion that digital sampling is a new form of piracy. First, differ-
ences between piracy decisions and the Sound Recording Act are ex-
plored to determine the extent of protection envisioned by the Act.
Second, the link between technology and methods of piracy are examined
acknowledging the relationship between technological innovation and
the growth of piracy. Third, the legal theories and policies behind the
piracy decision reveal the particular, separate property rights of copy-
right authors protected by the Act.
A. Distinctions between State Piracy Law
and the Sound Recording Act
Record piracy is the unauthorized duplication of the sounds on
copyrighted records, tapes, cassettes, compact discs or any other form of
sound storage.46 However, prior to 1972, federal law protected only the
musical composers from piracy." The composer alone had the exclusive
right to record his composition and reproduce copies to sell for profit.
Thus the early piracy cases envisioned the songs as extensions of a com-
poser's copyright in his composition rather than intellectual creations of
both the composer and the musical performers.48 However, state piracy
decisions based on the concepts of unjust enrichment, unfair competition
Instead it leaves to pending or future litigation the validity of state common law or statutes
governing the unauthorized copying of existing recordings." 1971 HOUSE REPORT, supra note
9, at 1578.
The distinction is not due to any inherent differences in the recordings. Actually the
intent of Congress was to fully protect all sound recordings until January 1, 1978; see 17
U.S.C. § 303 (1976). A Justice Department misconception led to the exclusion of the works.
Due to the differences in successive bills, the Department feared that the enactment of a federal
statute would render state law unconstitutional. NIMMER, supra note 20, at § 2.10 B(l). The
Senate agreed and acted hastily, voting to exclude state law from federal preemption to sound
recordings made prior to 1972. See infra note 61.
46. 1971 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 29.
47. The Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 5(e), l(a) and l(c) (1976).
48. This was a natural result from the 1909 Act, which viewed the sound recording as an
extension of the composition, rather than a separate work of authorship.
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and misappropriation helped to define the property rights eventually ex-
tended to performing artists by the Sound Recording Act. Yet it is an
important distinction that early piracy cases did not consider or focus on
the individual musical creations, or in other terms, the actual sounds fix-
ated on the record, as the Act does.49
This exclusion created a judicial and legislative tendency to view
piracy in the historical fashion, i.e., the illegal duplication of an entire
song or album. Consumers purchased a song or album in the form of a
record; thus, pirates copied and sold popular records. There was no mar-
ket for ten seconds of a song, or parts of a song like the separated sounds
of the individual instruments. Before digital technology, it was not possi-
ble to precisely separate sounds on a record.5 ° That was the piracy of the
past.
Piracy is no longer limited to simple copying of an entire song. The
crucial distinction is that digital sampling pirates today utilize only parts
of a song. Therefore, instead of the piracy occurring after the recording
of a work (i.e., making bootleg copies for resale), today's piracy occurs
during the recording phase as part of a new sound recording. This form
of piracy has never been encountered before. The new forms of piracy
require an expansion of the definition of piracy as well as an updated
analysis of copyright infringement acknowledging the expansion pro-
scribed by the Sound Recording Act.
B. The Link between Technology and the Growth of Piracy
According to the Department of Justice, piracy of records produced,
recorded and copyrighted in the United States yields annual sales in ex-
49. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (focus on the
composition, not the sounds).
50. Before digital audio recording, analog technology was the dominant process in sound
recording. The problem with the analog system was that it contained too much noise
distortion.
In effect, the distortion is an analog noise, combined with the analog music as the
tape is recorded. Later on, the play back head faithfully reproduces the signal, which
is now a somewhat-distorted version of the original source.
The problem (though certainly not the solution) is obvious. The playback head
is incapable of making a distinction between the wanted and the unwanted compo-
nents of the analog signal, or now rather, signal-plus-noise.
In order to get around our difficulties, we must devise a method of recording in
which the playback system will simply not recognize (and therefore, will not
reproduce) the unwanted noise components of the recorded signal.
J. WORAM, THE RECORDING STUDIO HANDBOOK, 418 (1982).
Digital recording was the answer to analog distortion. By converting analog amplitudes
into a binary-coded digital system the tape head receives an encoded signal thereby freeing the
recording from any sound distortion. Id. at 423.
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cess of $1 billion.5' Throughout the history of piracy, the cases below
illustrate that the methods consistently mirror the contemporary techno-
logical sophistication. The ingenuity of the thief increases with technol-
ogy. 52 The state courts have protected the sounds of copyrighted works
through all the technological innovations the industry has undergone.
This is evident in that even before records were common, early piracy
cases concerned the illegal duplication of perforated piano rolls!53 When
Victrola Talking Machines emerged, the courts responded immediately
by prohibiting a new form of matrix duplication. 4
In the 1940's, however, the emergence of the phonograph disc and
record player along with machines that could mass produce copies of the
recording, created the opportunities that led to the modern illegal piracy
industry. Similarly, another upswing in piracy occurred in the 1960's
with development of pre-recorded tape, first used in "eight track" tapes.
Eight track tapes were replaced in the 1970's with cassette tapes, spur-
ring another increase in piracy due to the relative ease of cassette dupli-
cation.55 The 1980's have seen the piracy of records and tape cassettes
extended to compact discs.
Congress recognized that technological innovation greatly affects
the recording industry. The Sound Recording Act broadly defines "pho-
norecords" to include objects in which the recording of sounds are "fixed
by any method now known or later developed." 56 The recent develop-
ment of digital audio technology presents a profound effect on the re-
cording industry because it is not simply a new device to store sounds,
like a record or cassette, but rather a new process or method in the sci-
ence of recording sounds. Digital audio recordings render previous tech-
nology obsolete.5 7 Recalling that state courts have prohibited piracy
51. SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL LAW, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REP. TO ACCOMPANY
S. 691, S. REP. No. 42, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1981).
52. Id. at 40. From its beginning the law of copyright developed in response to significant
changes in technology. Indeed, the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the print-
ing press-gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. Repeatedly, as develop-
ments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules
that recent technology has made necessary. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464
U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984).
53. Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
54. Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Armstrong, 132 F. 711 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
55. "The widespread availability and use of phonograph record and tape-playing ma-
chines, particularly the comparatively inexpensive cassette or cartridge tape players, give ad-
ded impetus to piracy of sound recordings. This trend [technological progress facilitating
piracy] is certain to continue and to grow unless effective legal methods to combat and reverse
it are provided." 1971 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 1576.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). See supra note 3 for text of section 106.
57. J. WORAM, THE RECORDING STUDIO HANDBOOK, 417 (1982) states:
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from piano rolls to compact discs, the unique ability of digital sampling
may require an updated response by both the courts and legislatures.
C Legal Theories Used to Protect Property Rights
When a pirate illegally re-records or copies the sounds on record,
and resells the copies for profit, what does he take? State decisions based
on legal theories of unjust enrichment, unfair competition and misappro-
priation helped to identify specific property rights protected from piracy.
The protection of property rights was eventually extended to musical
performers by the Act. However, judicial assumptions inapplicable to
the Act were eventually extended to post-Act decisions. This section
looks at dynamic and valuable state court decisions, some of which are
instructive yet no longer fully applicable.
Prior to 1972 only the composer was granted federal copyright pro-
tection. To take advantage of that protection the composer was required
to prove: (1) ownership of the copyright, (2) access to the copyrighted
work, (3) that the accused copied his work and (4) that there is a sub-
stantial degree of similarity between his composition and the in-
fringer's.5 8 One of the rights granted to the composer was the exclusive
right to record his composition. Performers or musicians captured in the
recording were not protected on their own. Thus, courts only viewed the
composer as the party suffering damages by piracy, even though he did
not create any of the sounds used in the recording.
The focus on the composer as the holder of exclusive recording
rights led to two problems. First, a limited perception of the definition of
a song or record, and second, the "back-door concept" used to justify
piracy.59
1. Limiting Judicial Perception With a Definition of a Song
Perhaps the most profound legacy of state piracy decisions is the
Despite many impressive advances in recording technology over the past century, at
least one basic principle has-until quite recently-remained unchanged. Ever since
the first recording was etched onto a wax cylinder, the recorded format-if not the
quality-has closely resembled the waveform of the original sound source.
Previously, there was little need to concern ourselves with this fine point, since
there were no alternative methods of recording anyway. But now that digital tech-
nology has been introduced to the recording studio, it is often necessary to make the
distinction between old and new ....
Id.
58. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162
(9th Cir. 1977).
59. 1971 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 1579.
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judicial tendency to view a song or recording as a single unit or product
containing only one copyright, that of the composer.6' In other words, a
song was viewed as a single work of authorship or intellectual creation.
This is in complete contrast with the Sound Recording Act, which views
the song or recording as a combination or collection of numerous copy-
righted works or intellectual creations bound together in a joint effort
resembling one work-a song.61
The view that a song was a single product with a solitary copyright
originated from a traditional piracy practice, the illegal duplication of a
popular copyrighted song or album. Traditional piracy was based on
market realities, where consumers purchased entire songs. However,
with the passage of the Sound Recording Act and the emergence of digi-
tal sampling, the judicial tendency to view a song or record as a single
work with a single copyright must be abandoned in favor of an updated
view incorporating the expanded protection and recognition of the Act.
Similarly, the judicial definition of piracy must be updated to meet the
new sophisticated forms of piracy created by digital sampling.
2. The Back Door Concept
The second problem caused by the solitary focus on the composer as
the exclusive holder of recording rights was the "Back Door" concept
arising from the old Copyright Act of 1909's "compulsory licensing pro-
vision." This provision required the composer to allow any other person
to record his composition. Thus, it allowed another manufacturer to rec-
ord the song using different vocalists and musicians. The subsequent
user had to give notice and pay the statutory royalty fee of a few cents
per record manufactured to the composer. 62 Congress imposed a com-
60. "The policy of the law is to protect the author against every form of piracy without
distinction, and the piracy of a musical composition by reproducing and selling it . . . is just as
culpable as in any other form." White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 2 (1907).
"If an author has among his writings a musical composition, the only possible way of 'secur-
ing' to him the 'exclusive right' thereto is by giving him the monopoly of this musical composi-
tion, no matter in what form it may be represented; otherwise, he gets only a partial exclusive
right thereto." Id. at 3. White-Smith concerned the piracy of perforated piano rolls.
Although the above assertions made by the composer were usually recognized by the court,
only the labor of the punch hole maker was protected in piano roll piracy. Id. at 16.
61. However, the Supreme Court has held that even under the 1909 Act, state laws prohib-
iting record piracy are not invalid by reason of federal preemption. Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546 (1973). Therefore, the tendency to view sound recordings as solely the com-
poser's work has been avoided in the few states which enacted piracy laws. See infra note 7 1.
62. 1971 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 1579. Section 1(e) of the Copyright Act of
1909, the compulsory licensing provision, provides:
[As] a condition of extending the copyright control to such mechanical reproduc-
tions, that whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or permitted or
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pulsory licensing provision on the composer because it feared a small
number of record companies would buy the rights to all existing musical
compositions and monopolize the exclusive right to record them.63
The implicit policy behind the provision was the belief that music
should be freely accessible to anyone wishing to use it, and if the pro-
posed use was a commercial one, then payment of a licensing fee to the
composer was required. However, a troubling misconception arose out
of the provision. The compulsory license provision applied only to the
composition or musical score of a recorded song, not the sounds of the
recorded song itself.6' Ignoring this, pirates, asserting the implicit policy
of musical freedom, justified illegal duplication of the sounds fixated on
the record, by paying the compulsory licensing fee. Despite the limita-
tions of the provision it became a back door justification for pirates ille-
gally duplicating the sounds of a record.
knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instru-
ments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other person may
make similar use of the copyrighted work upon the payment to the copyright propri-
etor of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part manufactured, to be paid by the manu-
facturer thereof.
17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909).
63. PIRACY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 17-18.
64. 1971 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 1567, 1579. However, beginning with the pre-
cedent-setting Duchess Music case, it was held that the compulsory license in a musical compo-
sition was not available to one who re-records music from another sound recording, and
therefore that such activity resulted in copyright infringement of the composition. The court
held that re-recording was not the "similar use" intended by the compulsory licensing provi-
sion. "She does not make 'similar use' of them, she makes exact and identical copies of them.
This is clearly outside the scope of the compulsory license scheme." Duchess Music Corp. v.
Stem, 458 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972) (footnote omitted).
The case has been criticized because its attempt to protect the composition in fact pro-
tected the copyright in a sound recording, which the plaintiff composer did not own. As a
result, the composer won a cause of action for the reproduction of what he did not create or
own, the sound recording. Despite the inconsistencies in the Duchess Music rationale, it has
been followed almost without question. However, the dissent in Jondora Music Publishing Co.
v. Melody Recording, Inc., 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1012 (1975) likens this preference to "the children of Hamelin [in] their erroneous
piping." Id. at 401. Judge Gibbons divided the sound recording into three components: the
musical composition, the performance, and the recording itself. He reasoned that since only
the composition was protected by the 1909 Copyright Act, once a recording had been author-
ized, the right to record became non-exclusive. By paying the compulsory licensing royalties a
pirate does not infringe. Following the Duchess Music rationale, courts in the Third, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits "have attempted to provide a remedy which was not envisaged by the 1909
Act." Jondora, 506 F.2d at 401 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
This interpretation of the 1909 Copyright Act was rebutted by the court in Fame Publish-
ing Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1975). "[N]either the district
court nor this court is bound by rather impressionistic statements in a legislative history as to
what a prior existing law means. Especially is this true when, as here, a great deal of time (63
years) has elapsed between the two Congresses involved." Id. at 672.
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Although the misconception concerning the compulsory licensing
provision for musical composition led to the mistaken belief that one
could pay the licensing fee and justifiably duplicate a record, later cases
clarified the protectable rights of the musical performer, as opposed to
the composer. For example, in Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody
Recordings,65 the federal court ruled that the compulsory license provi-
sion of the federal copyright statute was enacted to prevent monopoliza-
tion by manufacturers rather than to penalize the composer for his
creative efforts.66 Although the defendants had paid the compulsory li-
censing fee, the court held the provision did not legitimize their piracy
operation. The court then focused on the wording of the provision. The
"similar use" allowed by the provision was to use the composition in the
recording of a song. Thus, "similar use" meant the right to assemble
one's own labor to record a version of the composition, not to make simi-
lar use of a song by duplicating the recording and selling copies.67 Two
artists may record the same song, but the first artist has exclusive control
over the sounds he produces, and reciprocally, the second artist exclu-
sively controls his sounds.
Following Jondora, the court in Fame Publishing Co. v. Alabama
Custom Tape, Inc.,6 held that a taped duplicate is not a "similar use" of
a composition even though the end product is not only similar but virtu-
ally identical because the process is completely similar.69 The process of
reproduction involved in piracy is completely unlike the process in the
original recording since the latter involves the dynamics of recording live
musicians while the former only requires placement of a finger on the
RECORD button of a tape player.7 °
The policy in the above cases illustrates a reluctance to allow a pi-
65. 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at 395-96. Indeed, the court illustrated how the composer's interests were inter-
twined with the record manufacturer's:
Since the pirate's only initial expense is the purchase of one phonograph record or
sound tape, he obviously can sell a duplicate at a substantially lower price. If the
market is reduced by these cut-rate copies, the record manufacturer's incentive to
market other hit recordings is necessarily diminished. In turn, this is a detriment to
the composer, who may anticipate that his works will be performed in a less costly
production and possibly receive less public attention.
Id. at 396.
67. Id. at 397. "It is our conclusion that making an identical copy of a recorded version of
a copyrighted musical composition is not a 'similar use' as permitted by the compulsory license
provisions of § 1(e)." Id.
68. 507 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1975).
69. Id. at 669-70. "This distinction [between product and process] is not mere musical
metaphysics, it is the dividing line between that which the statute commands and that which it
forbids." Id.
70. Id. at 669.
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rate to profit from the work of another. This principle is the cornerstone
of the legal theories used in state piracy decisions. Unlike federal copy-
right law, state common law copyright long recognized that vocalists,
musicians and engineers have property rights.7 1 Yet it took record man-
ufacturers a shorter time to gain such recognition.7 2 The problem with
common law copyright is that it terminates once one publishes or distrib-
utes the work to the public.7 3 However, the states went through contor-
tions to preserve common law copyright after publication.
State common law protection is usually based on the legal theories
of unfair competition, misappropriation and the similar notion of unjust
enrichment. Unlike copyright laws, unfair competition does not require
that a work be original to qualify for protection. The policy is similar to
basic property law: if you create it, you own it. Unfair competition was
originally composed of three elements.74 First, there is competition be-
71. In Gieseking v. Urania Records, 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1956), the New
York Supreme Court held that performers have a property right in recorded performances
when the court enjoined the defendant from reproducing records of the pianist Walter Giesek-
ing. The court also held that the recorded performances may not be used in a manner not
intended to represent, or not fairly representing, his service. Id.
However, in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631
(1937), the court acknowledged the lack of federal protection and answered the question of:
whether an actor or musician has any property rights at common law in his perform-
ance ... in the present case we are concerned more particularly with the musician-
to guard against his field of lucrative return being thus drastically narrowed, and to
protect his artistic product against its indiscriminate reproduction, especially by
those who, in a commercial sense, are in the nature of competitors.
Id. at 438-39, 194 A. at 634.
The court rejected the notion that a musician does nothing more than render articulate
the silent composition of the author:
Caruso, Paderewski, Kreisler and Toscanini, by their interpretations, definitely ad-
ded something to the work of authors and composers which not only gained for
themselves enduring fame but enabled them to enjoy financial rewards from the pub-
lic in recognition of their unique genius; indeed the large compensation frequently
paid to such artists is testimony in itself of the distinctive and creative nature of their
performances.
Id. at 440, 194 A. at 635.
72. In 1951, the New York Supreme Court recognized the effects of Columbia Record's
contract with the Metropolitan Opera for exclusive rights to the recording and releasing of its
operatic performances. The defendant was enjoined from recording and selling lower quality
recordings of performances broadcast on the radio. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950), aff'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951). After the Sound Recording Act of 1971 was enacted into law, it was
held that "[s]ound recording firms provide the equipment and organize the diverse talents of
arrangers, performers, and technicians. These activities satisfy the requirements of authorship
found in the copyright clause ...." Shaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589, 590 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
73. NIMMER, supra note 20, at § 9.01 C, 9-17 - 9-19.
74. The elements seemed to have been reduced to simply misappropriation and self compe-
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tween the original author and the duplicator." For example, the artist
records and sells his record, while the pirate duplicates the artist's record
and sells those copies. This is a form of unfair competition because the
artist is forced to compete with himself. Every time the pirate sells one
of the artist's records, the artist loses a sale.
The second element was "passing off" or "palming off". The pirate
would "pass off" or borrow the image of an existing product in order to
entice and deceive the consumer. The purchaser, lured by the appear-
ance of the counterfeit, buys a substandard copy rather than the original
product. This element was abandoned by the court in Fonotipia Ltd. v.
Bradley,76 where the pirates clearly labeled their record as an unauthor-
ized duplication. The court reasoned that this factor was insignificant
because the real legal issue was the misappropriation of the artist's work,
which is the third and most influential element of unfair competition.
Misappropriation, the taking or stealing of another's product or
ideas without permission or compensation, is the crux of piracy, copy-
right, and the Act. Courts grant relief whenever one party gains a com-
tition. Passing or palming off has been viewed as an implicit characteristic of misappropria-
tion. As stated in Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951, 957 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909):
If the defendant is selling to customers records reproduced by processes of the Conti-
nental Record Company, by means of discs purchased in the market by that com-
pany for the purpose, and if he advertises and guarantees to his customers that the
Continental records are duplicates equal in all respects, including composition and
finish, and that it is impossible to distinguish between the Continental records and
those produced by the complainants, we have a question of fact presented in which
the public is interested, namely, do the records submitted as evidence in the case lead
to any determination upon the question of deception or imitation of the product, and
the resultant benefit to the imitator, with corresponding injury to the imitated, by the
results of the sales, and by the effect upon future sales if the product of the imitation
be unsatisfactory?
It may be argued that the imitation would go out of the market and be removed
from interference with the original if the product proved unsatisfactory; but it would
seem that business reputation and excellence of product are entitled to some protec-
tion from imitations which discourage further use and prove unsatisfactory as a
whole, because the result of the sale of such a product must necessarily affect ad-
versely the opinion of the very class of customers which is sought to be enlarged by
the sale of a satisfactory product.
Id.
75. "[Tjhe question of what is unfair competition in business must be determined with
particular reference to the character and circumstances of the business." International News
Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918). The command prohibiting competitors
from injuring one another actually is a duty.
The parties are competitors in this field, and, on fundamental principles, applicable
here as elsewhere, when the rights or privileges of the one are liable to conflict with
those of the other, each party is under a duty so to conduct its own business as not
unnecessarily or unfairly to injure that of the other (citation).
Id. at 235-36 (citing Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 254 (1916)).
76. 171 F. 951 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909), overruled on other grounds, G. Ricordi Co. v. Haen-
dler, 194 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1952).
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mercial advantage by appropriating the commercially valuable
characteristics of another's product or idea.77 In International News Ser-
vice v. Associated Press, " the court held that one cannot profit in any
manner from the appropriation of another's work, even if that work is
non-copyrightable.79 This case involved a competing newspaper which
appropriated, verbatim, news stories from another newspaper for publi-
cation. Even though news or facts are not copyrightable, the expression
of the facts is the work of another and may not be appropriated. 0
The concept of misappropriation was applied to musical artists be-
ginning with Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting. 8  The court held that the
unauthorized broadcasting of a performer's music by a radio station
amounted to a misappropriation of his "novel intellectual or artistic [ge-
nius and] value,"82 and thus was deemed unfair competition. Although
the radio station did not duplicate or sell a copy of the work, they did
profit from another's labor. The courts were equally protective when
they encountered instances of piracy.
Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern83 and Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v.
Colorado Magnetics84 are cases where pirates made tape copies of copy-
righted records. The Marks court held that the "raw materials," or mu-
sical sounds, were not authorized for duplication by the compulsory
licensing fee, and that authorization from the copyright proprietor was
necessary to duplicate.8 5 However, in the case of United States v. Bo-
din,86 the court specifically addressed the activities involved in piracy.
After determining that the misappropriation of another's work had never
fallen within the compulsory license provision, 7 the court responded to
the defendant pirate's claim that copying records was within his First
77. The Supreme Court recognized that
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized interference with
the normal operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point
where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the profit
from those who have earned it to those who have not; with special advantage to
defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not burdened with any part
of the expense [of creating or obtaining the product or service sold to the customer].
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240 (1918).
78. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
79. Id. at 241-42.
80. Id.
81. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
82. Id. at 441, 194 A. at 635.
83. 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972). See supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
84. 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1974).
85. Id. at 288.
86. 375 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
87. Id. at 1267.
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Amendment right of self-expression. The court wryly reminded the de-
fendants that they were not being denied freedom of expression since
they were not seeking to express themselves artistically, but the right to
express others artistically, by making exact sound recordings of other
people's performances.8 8 The court stated, "[w]e fail to see as any pro-
tected First Amendment right a privilege to usurp the benefits of the
creative and artistic talent, technical skills, and investment necessary to
produce a single long-playing record of a musical performance. 9
The court then rejected the contention that the public right to enjoy
the arts promoted by individuals was being compromised. 90 The defend-
ants were free to record the same songs they were pirating, if they hired
their own musicians, rented their own studio and paid the compulsory
licensing fee to the composer, since "[t]here is here no restraint placed on
the use of an idea or concept."'" The court described the critical distinc-
tion between the protection granted to compositions as opposed to that
granted to sound recordings. The law does not prohibit using ideas or
concepts found in a song. It prohibits using another performer's voicing
of those ideas or concepts-the actual sounds an artist fixes on a record.
As the court in Duchess92 (similarly stated:)
[The pirate] may, of course, record appellants' songs, when she
hires musicians, artists, and technicians. Instead, she steals the
genius and talent of others. She deceives others into thinking
that her tapes represent her own work. She has no "right to
copy." (citations) [The pirate] may not continue her piracy
under the flag of compulsory licensing.93
Finally, the very same prohibition against the unjust enrichment of a
pirate misappropriating another's work can be found in the earliest deci-
sion mentioned-the perforated piano roll case.94 The court told the per-
forated piano roll pirate that he must go to the composer's sheet music,
and punch the holes himself, but "[h]e cannot avail himself of the skill
and labor of the original manufacturer of the perforated roll . . . .9
The extent of protection granted to sound recordings remains un-
changed regardless of the technological capabilities of the era. From pi-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1267-68.
91. Id. at 1267.
92. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972).
93. Id. at 1311 (quoting Capitol Records v. Greatest Records, 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252
N.Y.S.2d 553 (1964))(citations omitted).
94. Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
95. Id. at 927.
19881
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
ano roll to digital recorder, the state and federal courts' double mandate
is clear. First, the unauthorized duplication of copyrighted sound re-
cordings constitutes misappropriation (theft) of another's commercially
valuable intellectual property. Second, the only legal process of repro-
ducing the sounds fixated on a copyright recording is by imitation or
simulation utilizing one's own studio and musicians. The sounds on a
record are the genius and talent of the musical laborer.
THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST: MUSICAL COMPOSITION AND
SOUND RECORDINGS
This third journey explores decisions determining copyright in-
fringement in musical composition cases in order to discern how the sub-
stantial similarity test should be applied to sound recordings. In order to
avoid confusion in this complex area, the substantial similarity test and
musical composition cases are discussed first. Next, the differences be-
tween musical compositions and sound recordings are examined to ex-
pose inapplicable assumptions from the composition field that have been
imposed upon sound recordings. Finally, the application of the substan-
tial similarity test to sound recordings is analyzed and some suggestions
are made on how to apply the test to digital sampling.
A. Substantial Similarity and Musical Compositions
To infringe on a copyrighted work, one must copy from the work.
However, since the actual act of copying is rarely witnessed,96 or is im-
possible to witness because it can occur entirely within the mind of the
infringer,97 copying is rarely established by direct evidence.9" As a re-
sult, copying is proved by proof of access and substantial similarity.99
"Access" is defined as the actual viewing and knowledge of plaintiff's
work by the person who composed defendant's work." ° Proving that a
person had access, however, can be as difficult as proving that a person
copied, because again, there are few who witness the actual "access."
96. Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Whitney v.
Ross Jungnickel, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Golding v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 35
Cal. 2d 690, 221 P.2d 95 (1950).
97. Edward S. Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 F.2d 35 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
273 U.S. 738 (1926).
98. Whitney, 179 F. Supp. at 755; Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106
(9th Cir. 1970).
99. Ferguson v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1978); Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
100. Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 287 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1961); Schwarz v.
Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
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Therefore, access can be proven by showing the defendant had an
opportunity to copy the work, which permits an inference of access.' 0 '
However, there must be a reasonable possibility of viewing the work, not
just a chance possibility. 0 2 Although access is difficult to prove, it will
be presumed if there is a "striking similarity" which is "substantial" be-
tween the plaintiff's and defendant's work.'0 3 This is especially benefi-
cial to authors whose works are widely known. Therefore, if a work is
disseminated widely throughout a region, access may be found."° In the
case of compositions and sound recordings, record sales and radio time
will constitute automatic access.105
To prove copyright infringement not only must copying be estab-
lished, but there must be a substantial similarity between the plaintiff's
and defendant's work. Unfortunately, "the determination of the extent
of similarity which will constitute a 'substantial' and hence infringing
similarity presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright law,
and one which is least susceptible to helpful generalizations."'0 6 Obvi-
ously, trivial similarities are inconsequential and noninfringing.' °7 Con-
versely, copying something entirely is an infringement.
The great challenge is to divine the exact point at which copying
becomes an infringement. The courts have described the situation as an
invisible line between faintly copying and substantial copying which
"wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary."'0 8 Of course, the Copyright
Act itself does not protect against the taking of abstract ideas.1°9 Ideas
101. Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981).
102. Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
103. This occurs when the defendant's work has unique traits of the plaintiff's work that
are too similar to be considered the product of an independent creation. Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946);
Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd per
curiam, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984). See also Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp.
1346 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
104. Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., Ill F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).
105. In Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court
held that widespread sales in many regions constitute access but localized performances do
not. Id. at 1394. In Abkco Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir.
1983), the court ruled that holding the number one position on the Billboard charts for five
weeks easily constituted access. Wide dissemination on television also will result in an infer-
ence of access. Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Canada, Ltd., 452 F.
Supp. 429 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
106. Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1981),
aff'd, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
107. Caddy-Imler Creations, Inc. v. Caddy, 299 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1962).
108. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1982).
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themselves are not protectable; only their expressions are." ° In other
words, it is not the thought of the ideas, but rather the physical manifes-
tation of the thought that receives protection. Because this area is ab-
stract by definition, especially so when dealing with the medium of
music, each case must be decided upon its specific facts."'
One factor indicating infringement, however, is the taking from a
copyrighted work for a commercial purpose. This is because "every
commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair ex-
ploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright.""' 2 This factor's importance sets the reference for the sub-
stantial similarity test in musical composition and sound recordings.
Since there can be similarity between works without copying,"
3
there must be some copying of the plaintiff composer's work for an in-
fringement to exist. The question is what part and how much of a work
must be copied to constitute an infringement. In essence, the substantial
similarity test measures the extent of copying and its use in the subse-
quent record. Specifically, has there been enough copying of the plain-
tiff's work by the defendant to the extent that there is a substantial
similarity between the two works? However, substantial similarity is not
simply a quantitative analysis, but a qualitative one.'"'
110. "[A] copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to
the expression of the idea-not the idea itself." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
111. "Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying
the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
However, courts have come up with methods to guide the decisions, including Judge
Hand's abstractions test.
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last
may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist of only its title; but there is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could pre-
vent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is
never extended.
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
As for the value of the abstractions test, no one who has ever drawn a legal breath "has
been able to improve upon Judge Learned Hand's famous 'abstractions test'." Sid & Marty
Krofft Television, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Nich-
ols, 45 F.2d at 119).
112. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). See also Harper and
Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
113. Without copying, there can be no infringement of copyright regardless of the extent of
similarity. This is because it is quite probable that two people could conceive of similar ideas
without knowledge of each other's activities. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1946); Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d
275 (2d Cir. 1936).
114. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986).
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In the quantitative analysis, even when a plaintiff proves the defend-
ant copied, he cannot prevail unless he can also establish that the defend-
ant copied a substantial portion of the plaintiff's work, showing that the
two works are substantially similar. ' 15 The federal courts did not wish to
enjoin a work simply because a small part of one song was similar to a
small part of another song.' 16 Thus, in order to infringe, one must utilize
a substantial amount of the work. This may be standard for musical
compositions but it has disastrous effects when applied to sound
recordings.
This quantitative approach, however, has been challenged as an in-
adequate measure because a unique portion can be very small in
length.' In other words, although the amount taken may be small, it
may be the unique portion that gives the song quality. The qualitative
analysis reasons that if the chorus or a unique melody is appropriated,
the whole song is damaged. "No plagiarist can excuse the wrong by
showing how much of his work he did not pirate. '""I8 It is the consumer
value, or what appeals and motivates the consumer musically, that con-
cerns the courts. Federal courts have defined this qualitative measure of
substantial similarity as determining if the defendants took "the whole
meritorious part of the song"'' 9 or "the very part that makes [the plain-
tiff's work] popular and valuable,"' 2 ° or "that portion of [the plaintiff's
work] upon which its popular appeal, and hence, its commercial success,
depends,"'' or "what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners."' 22
Some cases have attempted to form bright line rules, making im-
plicit qualitative and quantitative assumptions without analysis of the el-
ements. Mark v. Leo Feist, Inc., 123 a landmark case known for the "six-
bar rule," held that a taking of only six bars is not an infringement.
However, a more recent case, Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Dis-
115. Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, 17 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Cal. 1937).
116. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd on rehearing, 158 F.2d 795 (2d
Cir. 1947).
117. Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
118. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
669 (1936).
119. Northern Music, 105 F. Supp. at 397.
120. Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282, 283 (8th Cir.
1939).
121. Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795, 798 (S.D.
Cal. 1956).
122. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'don rehearing, 158 F.2d 795
(1947).
123. 290 F. 959 (2d Cir. 1923), modified on other grounds, 8 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1925).
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trib. Co., 124 held that the taking of only four bars was substantial and
therefore an infringement. Similar to Northern and contrary to Marks,
the court in Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 125 held that the six note taking
of a chorus "I hear you calling me" was substantial and thus a taking.
The basis for finding infringements in these small takings lies in the
courts' use of a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach.
After applying a mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis,
one can determine substantial similarity by judging the artistic and finan-
cial importance of the portion(s) copied or appropriated. As a result,
substantiality is measured with reference not to the defendant's, but the
plaintiff's work. Thus, the reference to the substantial similarity test is
the damage done to the entire musical work from which the note patterns
were taken. "The question in each case is whether the similarity relates
to matter which constitutes a substantial portion of the plaintiff's work-
not whether such material constitutes a substantial portion of the defend-
ant's work."' 26
Finally, a "demands test" has also been applied as part of the sub-
stantial similarity test. The demands test determines whether the copy-
ing work decreased the demand for the plaintiff's work by fulfilling the
same function as the plaintiff's work. 127 This test actually determines
unfair competition. For example, based on the demands test, it is per-
missible to print the lyrics of a song in a magazine article.128 However, if
the article prints the lyrics along with musical notation so that the song
can be played, this competes with the plaintiff's sheet music revenues,
and is forbidden.' 29 Thus, two works were deemed substantially similar
because the defendant copied so much of the plaintiff's work that de-
mand for the original decreased.13
0
B. Distinctions Between Musical Compositions and Sound Recordings
The pivotal issue lies in determining the correct application of the
substantial similarity test to sound recordings. Before one can apply this
test, distinctions between musical compositions and sound recordings
must be identified.
124. 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
125. 224 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
126. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
669 (1936).
127. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
128. See, e.g., Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).





Musical compositions are fixated by printed notation of musical
symbols on paper, commonly referred to as sheet music. Sound record-
ings, using a musical composition, are fixed on records and tapes by pro-
ducing and recording sounds. Thus, a note on paper is not the same as a
note in a sound recording. The protection against duplication given to a
sound voicing of a note in a recording is not extended to a note on paper.
Notes on paper are similar to letters in the alphabet. The individual
note is a tool of communication and thus not copyrightable. However,
the note voicings found in the sound recordings are individual unique
sounds or creations of the note found on paper and are copyrightable.' 3 '
In sound recordings, all of the sounds a musician creates are protected by
the Act since these sounds are the actual "work" of the author.
32
Hence, notes can be freely used as tools to create compositions. Alterna-
tively, notes found in sound recordings are, themselves, the copyrighted
works, and therefore cannot be used as tools in the creation of music.
Due to this basic difference, the substantial similarity test cannot be ap-
plied to sound recordings in the same manner as it is applied to musical
compositions.
C. The Substantial Similarity Test and Sound Recordings
How should the substantial similarity test be applied to sound re-
cordings? The copyright protection given to sound recording is special
and limited because the right of reproduction is extended only to the
actual sounds fixed in the recording. 3 3 Therefore, while the right to
reproduce other copyright categories is infringed by a duplicating work
that imitates or simulates in a substantial manner, the Act immunizes
imitations which are substantially similar to the original. As a matter of
fact, "mere imitation of a recorded performance would not constitute a
copyright infringement even where one performer deliberately sets out to
simulate another's performance as exactly as possible."'
134
This parasitic trait is a traditional phenomenon in the entertainment
industry. As soon as Frank Sinatra appeared on the musical horizon in
the early 1950's, the recording industry became inundated with tuxedoed
"crooners." In the late 1970's, when Eddie Van Halen first displayed his
unique guitar ability, the airwaves soon became inundated with guitarists
trying to copy his frenetic scale-playing style. When the rock group
131. See supra note 30.
132. See supra notes 37-39.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1976).
134. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1909).
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"KISS" first appeared in the middle 1970's, the heavy metal field filled
with bands imitating their image.
Therefore, if substantial similarity without actual sound re-record-
ing is not an infringement, then it seems that the only possible way to
infringe a sound recording is to re-record sounds from the original work.
Since the Act only extends protection to the actual sounds fixated in the
recording, it thus appears that the only issue is whether the defendant re-
recorded sounds from the original. By this reasoning, it would appear
that the substantial similarity test is inapplicable to the field of sound
recording.1 35 In short, the only issue is sound duplications, not substan-
tial similarity.
This was the exact decision of U.S. v. Taxe, 136 one of the most influ-
ential cases interpreting the Sound Recording Act. The case involved
defendants who were pirating, making and selling copies of hit tapes pro-
duced and distributed by major record companies. The defendants, dur-
ing re-recording of the songs, changed them in most instances by
speeding the sounds, deleting certain frequencies or tones, and adding
echoes or sounds from a moog synthesizer. The defendants claimed they
had made a derivative work, apart from the original recordings. Yet,
"evidence revealed these changes were insubstantial [since they were
inaudible] to the human ear and were intended to be so.
1 37
The court instructed the jury by stressing that the critical analysis is
whether the defendants' product was either a re-recording or an in-
dependent fixation utilizing their own engineering, musicians and fi-
nances, expressly excluding re-recording, even with changes.1 38 The
court went on to instruct the jury that since a new fixation by re-record-
ing with modifications is not an independent fixation, it constitutes in-
fringement. 139 The jury found the re-recording to be an infringement.
The court of appeals upheld the decision, but found the instruction
to be in error, stating that the test of substantial similarity is applicable to
sound recordings like every other medium of copyright."4° "We believe
the instruction went beyond the law insofar as it purported to character-
ize any and all re-recordings as infringements, but the subsequent inclu-
sion of a comparison test permitted the jury to consider 'substantial
135. United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, vacated and re-
manded in part, 540 F.2d 961 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
136. 380 F. Supp. at 1014.
137. Id. at 1013.
138. Id. at 1014-15.
139. Id. at 1015.
140. United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
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similarity', and cured any error in the earlier part of the instruction."' 14 1
The most important aspect of the court's ruling was that even though the
right to reproduce is limited to the recapture of the original sounds, that
right can be infringed by an unauthorized re-recording which, despite
changes in the sounds duplicated, results in a work of substantial similar-
ity. Thus, even though sound recordings do not expressly contain the
right to produce derivative works, the sound recording artist can now
prevent others from such activity.'
42
This holding is in line with the adaptive rights given to sound re-
cordings by the Act. Of course, the adaptive right, the right to arrange
different works from pre-existing sound recordings, is limited to the ac-
tual sounds fixed in the recording. 43 Therefore, one cannot re-record
sounds from a pre-existing work in order to create a new or derivative
work.
Therefore, according to the trial court in Taxe, " the substantial
similarity test, as applied to sound recordings, determines whether the
infringing work contains the actual sounds of a plaintiff's copyrighted
work, or instead, substantially similar but independently created sounds,
which are permitted by the Act. This test complies with the Act's com-
mand that the re-recording of any of the actual sounds fixated on a copy-
righted work, for commercial purposes, is strictly prohibited.
The analysis of the substantial similarity test, however, is not as sim-
ple as determining whether sounds on an allegedly infringing work are
re-recordings of a copyrighted work or instead, non-infringing but sub-
stantially similar, independently recorded sounds. The problem is found
in cases interpreting the Act that were influenced by musical composition
cases. These decisions fail to make the distinction between notes on pa-
per and notes from a sound recording. This is evident in Taxe, where the
court hypothesized "[t]he trivial re-recording[s] . . . of one or two notes,
... [and] re-recording[s] combined with such comprehensive changes [as
to render the re-recorded work] no longer recognizable to the original...
might very well be held to be such an insubstantial taking as not to in-
fringe. '"" ' Here, the ghost of composition law haunts the interpretation
of the Sound Recording Act.
Musical composition decisions hold that in order to infringe, the
defendant must copy a substantial amount. However, when a court
141. Id. at 965.
142. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1976).
144. 380 F. Supp. at 1014.
145. Id.
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states that the taking of a few notes may be insubstantial, it errs for three
reasons. First, the court fails to make the distinction that notes on paper
are tools, whereas notes in a sound recording are the copyrightable works
protected by the Act. Second, the court makes an implicit quantitative
test assuming that the taking of a few notes is insubstantial. Therefore,
the court fails to perform a qualitative analysis to determine if the unique
and meritorious aspects of the recording, or rather, the "portion of [the
plaintiff's work] upon which its popular appeal, and hence, its commer-
cial success, depends,"' 46 are taken by the re-recording of the "trivial"
notes. The dicta, "more than a trivial part . . . one or two notes,"
amounts to a vague qualitative and quantitative gauge. The Sound Re-
cording Act lacks a similar gauge for infringements simply because no
recordings are allowed of any of the actual sounds on a copyrighted rec-
ord for commercial uses.' 47 This is why the Act specifically allows for
imitation or simulation by independent re-creation, using one's own
labor.
Why all the fuss over two, three or four notes? This leads to the
third problem. Courts have never before conceptualized the new capabil-
ities created by digital sampling, which fostered new, unknown, sophisti-
cated methods of piracy. Taxe was decided in 1974, a full decade before
the emergence of digital audio technology. Courts have never envisioned
sound recordings through digital eyes. Although the taking of one or
two notes may be trivial in some cases, it can be substantial in another.
Taxe, therefore, which concerned illegal duplication of entire songs,
is influential for its dicta concerning a situation not even before it-the
taking of a few notes. Recalling how it is now possible to sample pho-
nemes to create new performances by Elvis, one realizes that the taking
of a few notes can result in a quantitative and qualitative substantial tak-
ing. Before addressing this point in the next section, the concept of "rec-
ognizability" must be discussed. The Taxe court directed in its jury
instructions that "[a]n infringement which recaptures the actual sounds
by re-recording remains an infringement even if the re-recorder makes
changes in the speed or tone of the original or adds other sounds or
deletes certain frequencies, unless the final product is no longer recogniz-
able as the same performance."' 48 In other words: Is the defendant's
product recognizable as the same sounds found on the originally re-
146. Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795, 798 (S.D.
Cal. 1956).
147. 1971 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 1570. See also text accompanying notes 37-39.
148. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. at 1017.
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corded performance? The recognizability test is therefore a very impor-
tant element of the substantial similarity analysis.
The problem lies in the judicial tendency to use an entire song as the
reference point for the recognizability test, asking whether the defend-
ant's song is recognizable as the plaintiff's song. This is another out-
dated assumption from composition and piracy decisions. It is the
tendency to view sound recordings as a single product with a single copy-
right. This is contrary to the Sound Recording Act, which recognizes
the input of musicians, vocalists, engineers and manufacturers as sepa-
rate copyrightable works. Therefore, the reference point for the recog-
nizability test should be: Is the defendant's product in any way
recognizable to any of the copyrighted works found in the plaintiff's
product? For example, a defendant may produce a product that is com-
pletely original, except for the digital sampling or re-recording of a few
trumpet riffs from a Miles Davis recording. Although the defendant's
song may not be recognizable as the entire song of Miles Davis from
which the recording was taken, the trumpet playing in the defendant's
song is recognizable as the trumpet playing of Miles Davis in his pre-
existing copyrighted recording.
The above example illustrates an important reference that should be
used when applying the substantial similarity test. Currently in the mu-
sic industry, digital samplers feel they do not infringe if they take only
one instrument from a "whole" song. For example, a recording featuring
a big band will commonly include eighteen to twenty musicians. To
claim that one did not infringe because only the tenor sax was sampled is
a misconception. Each musician on the album has a copyright in his
work, which usually has been purchased by the record company. 49
Therefore, the sampling of the tenor sax is an infringement of the saxo-
phonist's copyrightable work. To hold otherwise contradicts the Act's
recognition of each musician as a copyright author, and additionally
would set a precedent for a varying degree of acceptable misappropria-
tion. A helpful illustration is to view a song as a whole entity composed
of separate parts, similar to the body. The guitar, sax, piano and voice all
represent various organs, such as the heart, liver, kidneys and spleen.
Each component/organ is essential to the functioning of the whole. To
remove any one of them is to impair the body or the sound of a song.
However, what if only part of the tenor sax performance from the
big band record is sampled? Obviously, a qualitative and quantitative
149. However, many recording contracts vary according to the bargaining power of the
artist. As a result, the copyright proprietor can be multiple contracting partners.
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approach must be used. All decisions of infringement will inevitably be
ad hoc."' 0 For example, the United States Supreme Court held that 300
words copied from over 200,000 is an infringement because "[w]hat was
essentially the heart of the book" was taken.15 Similarly, another court
held that copying one minute and fifteen seconds from a one hour and
twelve minute motion picture to be "qualitatively substantial" and there-
fore an infringement.1
2
Again, no bright line exists to determine an infringement. Deciding
what is taken and how it is used is analyzed on an ad hoc basis. To
illustrate this point consider the two words "Hey you." Suppose a pirate
sampled these two words from separate Elvis songs. He then puts them
into a new song and they are repeated only twice among the sounds inde-
pendently created by other musicians and vocalists. Would this use be
an infringement? Perhaps this is trivial. However, what if the sampler
used the words "Hey you" two-hundred and seventeen times, building a
song around the phrase, which is modified and speeded up so that it
sounds different each time. In essence, Elvis becomes the vocalist-is
this an infringement? Consider even further if the sampler took the
words "Ain't nothing but a hound dog" and used the phrase thirty times.
Does this use infringe more because it may take away commercial sales
from the pre-existing song of the same name?" 3 These illustrations show
the need for ad hoc decision making.
150. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). See
supra note 111 and accompanying text.
151. Harper and Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1985) (citing
Harper and Row, 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
152. Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
153. The method employed by the court to determine the effect of the pirate's use upon the
potential market value of the original work has two stages. First, a comparison is made of the
media in which the two works may appear; second, a comparison is made in terms of the
function of each work regardless of the media. This is the functions test. Meredith Corp. v.
Harper and Row, Publishers, 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir.
1974).
However, "[s]ome commercial purposes, for example, might not threaten the [copyright
owner's] incentives because the user profits from an activity that the owner could not possibly
take advantage of." Pacific and Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir.
1984). As a result of these holdings a digital sampler cannot duplicate the sounds of a copy-
righted musical work because he uses them for the same function that the author does-sound




Is DIGITAL SAMPLING AN INFRINGING USE? UNCOVERING THE
IMPLICIT: A RIGHT TO CONTROL RECORDED
PERFORMANCE
One of the main reasons that digital sampling is difficult to concep-
tualize is because digital piracy occurs during record production, not
subsequently. Traditional piracy occurs by illegal duplication of a fin-
ished sound recording. For example, the traditional pirate waits until a
song is released, like Frank Sinatra singing "My Way," and then dupli-
cates the entire song in order to sell copies. Today's digital sampling
pirate will take individual words or sounds that Frank Sinatra sings in
order to release a new song (different lyrics and music) with Frank Sina-
tra singing.
Digital samplers record sound digitally and allow musicians, produ-
cers and equipment manufacturers to borrow (steal) other artist's signa-
ture instrumental or vocal sounds, making it possible to put the drum
sounds of Phil Collins or the guitar bite of Eddie Van Halen on any
record. 1
54
This misappropriation is fostered by two elements. First, there is
the judicial misperception that a mere trivial recording of a few notes is
not a taking. Second, there is either total contempt or ignorance of
piracy laws and the Sound Recording Act on the part of producers and
artists in the industry. This is illustrated in the following quote by a
producer, "On the one hand if I sample your voice and use the sound
unaltered so that it sounds exactly like you and I make good money from
the recording, that is not good. On the other hand, you could say, 'Look,
a sound is out there, it's public domain.' "15 What the producer is really
saying is, "I take your talent, genius and labor, and use it for my own
benefit to make money for myself, you (the artist) getting none, and while
I know that this is bad or wrong, I can do it because the law seems to
allow me because sounds are in the public domain."
Wrong! The Act recognizes and protects actual sound fixated in a
record by each copyright artist. In other words, the artist's individual
sounds are protected. The aforementioned producer needs to be re-
minded of United States v. Bodin. 16 That case held that there is no First
Amendment right to usurp the labor of another since a pirate does not
seek to express himself creatively, but to express another's creativity.I57
154. See Seligman supra note 1. See also Seligman, Digital Sampling: Is It Theft? Technol-
ogy Raises Copyright Question, 31 BILLBOARD MAG. 98 (1986)[hereinafter Digital Sampling].
155. Seligman, Digital Sampling, 31 BILLBOARD MAG. at 98.
156. 375 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
157. Id. at 1267.
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Recalling how piracy, fair use, musical composition and sound recording
laws prohibit the misappropriation of the unique intellectual creations
that are the product and property resulting from another's labor, con-
sider this incredibly incriminating quote by a producer:
In some cases you use a sample because it's a really unique
sound you want and it would be impossible to get otherwise,
like [the deceased member of Led Zeppelin,] John Bonham's
kick drum. In other cases, it is simply to save time. You could
probably, with a lot of set-up and experimentation, get the
sound you're after. But it's so much faster to use a sample. 58
In other words, the producer is saying: "When I take another's
work, I take it for one of two reasons. Either I take because it is a unique
creation and is the part of a song that makes it popular and valuable, and
I am unable by my own labor to produce the sound(s),1 59 or I take it so
that I do not have to perform the labor, nor bear the expense of creating
those sounds. It's easier to take from others and quicker too, so I save on
studio expenses as well." Digital sampling violates precisely what the
piracy, musical composition and sound recording laws try to protect-
the unique intellectual creations of copyrighted sound recording artists
and their careers. Reviewing these areas with digital sampling in mind
will illustrate that an artist's individual sounds are protected and that
sound recording artists have the implicit right to control recorded
performances.
Piracy laws historically responded to new forms of technology in
order to safeguard and protect the intellectual property found on records.
The effort to protect these works culminated with passage of the Sound
Recording Act. The advent of digital technology created new forms of
piracy previously unattainable. These new forms of piracy require a re-
158. See Seligman, Digital Sampling, supra note 154 at 98 (emphasis added).
159. Stealing the unique musical performances of the individual copyright artist amounts to
a usurping of their identity. This is especially disheartening for past legends who witness new
bands sampling their copyrighted works and receiving credit for their performances. Perhaps
the most blatent example of digital sampling occurred to legendary rock group, Led Zeppelin
when Def Jam Records' producer, Rick Rubin "boldly lifted the core Jimmy Page guitar riff
from the song 'The Ocean' for the Beasty Boys song 'She's Crafty.' " Fricke, Robert Plant,
ROLLING STONE, Mar. 24, 1988, at 58. Led Zeppelin's lead singer, Robert Plant, spoke di-
rectly toward producer Rubin's sampling of their music: "Maybe he ought to write his own
riffs then. He's not particularly an innovator in that way. There's loads of house music from
Chicago and rap stuff that steal Zeppelin in far less obvious ways. I guess if he's going to nick
something, he might as well nick something good. He's made a lot of money." Id. at 171.
According to Zeppelin copyright proprietors, this situation may end in litigation.
The problem is that young consumers hearing the record think the Beasty Boys are great
guitarists. Imagine their surprise at their first Beasty Boys concert, when they learn all the
music was taped and none of the Beasty Boys are musicians.
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analysis of the Act's piracy test. Congress rejected pleas for the sounds
fixated on a record to be subject to a compulsory license because they
viewed the sounds as the actual copyrighted work of the author. Both
the Act and piracy statutes have long recognized such duplications as
unfair competition and misappropriation of another's creative intellec-
tual property. The Act specifically limited the power of the sound re-
cording artist in that anyone using their own musicians and studio could
imitate or simulate any copyrighted sounds.
This illustrates that sound recording artists were given a very spe-
cific area of protection-limited to the actual sounds they fixate on a
record. Digital sampling now threatens to take away the very small area
of protection sound recording artists now rely on. Piracy laws and the
Act prohibited duplication to thwart the unfair competition and misap-
propriation engendered by piracy. Congress has continued to protect il-
legal duplication by passing the Record Rental Amendment of 1984,6'
by amending the "first sale" provision of the Act to prohibit record
rental, so that work could not be rented, taped and then returned. The
Senate Committee Hearings indicate Congress' intent to protect each
sound recording performer contributing to the sounds fixated on a
record.
Congress has recognized on many occasions that sound recordings
only bear the originality of the performer. Thus, the Act allows owner-
ship of the copyright in the work to be negotiated contractually accord-
ing to the percentage of original input. What protection is given to an
artist's work and career if others can call up their artistic work and signa-
tures by digitally manipulating their past performances? Digital sam-
plers in essence rob sound recording artists of a new recording contract
or session date and compensation for the use of their copyrighted work.
Sampling must not occur unless permission from the copyright author
has been obtained and proper compensation has been made.
In a statement submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on Piracy and
Counterfeiting, the Recording Industry Association of America outlined
the effects of piracy on each individual author.' 6 1 Recalling the differ-
160. Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 48-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984).
161. The RIAA depicted the injury to each Sound Recording Author by the following
statement:
[Mlost of these talented performers [recording artists] have only very brief careers
because of changes in consumer tastes . . . pirates feed off their careers when their
hits are selling well. Recording artists lose millions in royalties and fees from un-
checked activities of pirates. Pirates leave the new or less popular artists to be subsi-
dized by legitimate entertainment companies.
Both lead recording stars and the multitude of background musicians are di-
rectly injured every time (a pirated performance occurs) ... members of the Ameri-
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ences between a note on paper and a note voicing executed on a record,
the value of a few sounds becomes clear. Fifty saxophone players can all
blow a diminished C-A-G note sequence on their instruments, yet sam-
plers choose to ignore those fifty available musicians and take the C-A-G
note sequence the revered saxophonist Miles Davis creates. This is sim-
ply due to the same reason Miles Davis can be found on recordings, his
unique talent and genius overshadowing lesser players. The sampler
takes his genius by capturing his sound, without bearing the expense of
contracting or recording it.
The process of digitally sampling copyrighted sound recordings,
without the artist's knowledge or consent, violates the exclusive control
of the reproductive rights granted to performers by the Sound Recording
Act. The Act protects the commercial value and marketability of the
sounds, or rather, the unique intellectual creations produced by vocalists,
musicians, engineers and record manufacturers. However, the scope of
copyright protection is limited to the actual sounds fixated on a record.
Unlike other copyright authors, sound recording artists cannot prohibit
other entities from imitating or simulating their works of authorship.
This is due to Congress' desire to encourage musical freedom and pre-
vent the monopolization of the idea of a sound. As a result, only the
actual sounds an artist captures on a record are protected, and anyone is
free to perform or hire his own musicians and record his own imitation of
the sounds in the original work. The Act also recognizes each musical
performer, engineer and manufacturer as holding an individual copyright
in his work.
Thus, the Act treats a copyrighted song or recording as a combina-
can Federation of Musicians receive supplemental income through a Special
Payment Trust Fund, and Music Performance Trust Fund every time a record is
sold. In 1980 each fund received 19 million dollars. The current volume of pirating
... deprives these two musicians funds millions of dollars each year.
[Writers', composers', engineers', and publishers'] . .. earnings are determined
by the legitimate sales of records and tapes. When a piracy occurs, these individuals
are robbed of the fruits of their labor.
Pirating adversely effects the [record] companies since they take the risk invest-
ing in a record. Only a small percentage of records make money. In 1979, 84% of
all records failed to recover their cost; the record company is thus dependent on its
relatively few hits to cover its costs, develop new talent, subsidize losing projects and
hopefully make a profit. Pirates copy only the hits (or the unique) . . . depriving
record companies of the revenues they need to survive in a very risky business.
Id. at 34-37.
The RIAA went on to state that piracy and the Sound Recording Act are not being
enforced. Current RIAA President Jason S. Berman recently concluded that digital technol-
ogy "is the gravest threat we have ever faced." He suggested that all new recordings should be
manufactured with a certain anti-piracy frequency so that digital samplers and recorders can-
not duplicate the sounds. Yet this possible anti-piracy mechanism is of no benefit to past and
current record releases. Id.
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tion or collection of numerous copyrighted works or intellectual cre-
ations bound together in a joint effort resembling one work-a song.
This is contrary to the traditional outdated view found in piracy deci-
sions before the Act and digital sampling-a song is a single product
with a single copyright owner, the composer. The definition of piracy
must be updated to meet both the call of the Act and the new unknown
sophisticated forms of piracy created by digital sampling. Digital sam-
pling devices offer undreamed of capabilities allowing the capture of the
commercially valuable characteristics of copyrighted sound recording
artists. Throughout the history of piracy, the law has consistently pro-
tected sound recordings by responding to technological changes.
Although some may claim digital sampling is a new musical language,
when one samples copyrighted recordings the language has a one word
vocabulary-violation.
As the Bodin court wryly noted, there is no First Amendment right
to express yourself musically by using the recordings of others.162 One
must do the work himself and bear the expense. Similarly in musical
composition cases, courts have performed quantitative and qualitative
analysis to protect against the unique, seductive, commercially valuable
characteristics found in a musical piece. Therefore, when one samples
the sounds in a recording, the actual copyrighted works of the artist that
seduce and entice the consumer are misappropriated. Clearly, the intent
of the Act is to protect each individual sound component in a song. The
assertion that a mere trivial recording of a few notes is not an infringe-
ment is a baseless quantitative assumption with no place in an industry
threatened by digital sampling.
In reality, the pirate has taken the entire copyrighted work from the
trumpet player. If we apply the demands and function test to determine
substantial infringement, it is clear that digital sampling does decrease
the demand for the sampled artist's work because it fulfills the same
function as the artist's work. Thus, instead of having to hire, record and
purchase an artist's copyright, the pirate takes another's genius for free.
This activity also violates the Adaptive Rights given to the musical artist
by the Sound Recording Act. The Adaptive Right is limited to the right
to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds are altered in
sequence or quality. One is not free to make subsequent songs from a
pre-existing one. The custom in the recording industry is to contract
separately for each song. The resulting scope of the Act and the influ-
ence of piracy and musical composition decisions uncover the extent of
162. United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
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power bestowed on the sound recording author, the artist. The advent of
technology forces the recognition and rediscovery of the implicit right of
a sound recording artist-the right to control recorded performance.
Digital sampling is a pirate's dream come true and a nightmare for
all the artists, musicians, engineers and record manufacturers. Federal
courts must update their view of piracy and interpretation of the Act to
meet the sophistication of digital technology. Sounds are not ideas, but
expressions, and therefore copyrighted works. Without adequate protec-
tion, the Act will be virtually useless. Sampling specifically injures art-
ists. Their implicit right to control their recorded performance must be
recognized. This is a right that cannot be contracted away to the copy-
right proprietor. Perhaps record manufacturers who tire of an artist's
musical progression will view past works as a gold mine from which to
create new works without the artist's consent. Although this is a subject
for another paper, the artist's right to control recorded performance
should be acknowledged. Unchecked digital sampling will present the
incongruous result of a copyrighted work which is both protected by
copyright but is also part of the public domain. By any standard, digital
sampling is nothing but old fashioned piracy dressed in sleek new
technology.
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